INTRODUCTION
Although sociologists vary greatly in their thoughts on biology and social behavior, there is little question that "biology" can dramatically affect the behavior of sociology's journals. Recently-and unprecedentedly--the American Sociological Review published not just three hostile replies to an earlier articles, but also a statement by its former editor explaining and justifying the original decision to publish the article in the first place (Firebaugh 2001). Not long earlier, Social Forces made the unusual move of permitting a book's authors to respond to a provide a balanced portrait of some particularly contentious areas, and in so doing, we reserve some of our own criticisms in favor of presenting research programs on their own terms, although we include numerous references to both original research and critiques that readers can further explore.
THE RELEVANCE OF OUR EVOLUTIONARY PAST
The "historical turn in the social sciences" might be characterized as an increasing appreciation of how "the history and development of a thing... can tell you something fundamental of its nature" (Somers 1998, p. 731). Does this reasoning suggest also that reflection on the history of our species can tell you something fundamental about the nature of the human actor? One way of asserting the relevance of "biology" for understanding human social behavior is to propose that our understanding of human activities can be greatly enhanced by specific consideration of humans as evolved species shaped by processes of natural selection. Shermer 1996) , then what separates Darwinian social science from its more conventional alternatives is not whether evolutionary theory is correct but how useful specifically "evolution-minded" thinking is regarded for understanding behavior. One can, for example, believe natural selection has produced a human species whose behavior can be understood in terms of a relatively simple metanarrative of mind (e.g., rational choice theories, simple learning theories), such that further consideration of our evolutionary history is not useful, or one can believe that solid knowledge about our evolved past is so sparse that one should stick with building from what is proximate and observable, rather than trying to tie patterns to a past about which little is decisively known.
Alternatively, one can posit that explicit thinking in selectionist terms can yield discoveries of patterns of behavior otherwise overlooked or unknown to social science. To give one example, Daly & Wilson (1988 have proposed that selection would have favored parents who restrained potentially harmful anger toward their children, but those placed in parent-like positions toward children not their own-namely, stepparents-would lack this evolutionary incentive for caring, restrained behavior. Their subsequent research has indicated that living with a stepparent, as opposed to two biological parents, may be the largest known risk factor for being a victim of child abuse. Buss (1999, p. 203 Complicating matters is that many who see evolutionary psychology as a "new science" use the term only to apply to a particular set of theoretical commitments articulated most importantly by Tooby & Cosmides (1992) (see also Buss 1995), whereas others-partly because of the various negative connotations that sociobiology has accrued-want this specific program to be seen as just one way of doing evolutionary psychology.
Even in its more restricted sense, evolutionary psychology has attracted scholars well beyond psychology, but the name does accurately point to a stronger psychological focus than preceding programs of Darwinian social science. Evolutionary psychology resolutely argues that any connections of behavioral patterns to our genetic evolution must be strictly mediated by theories of how evolution has shaped psychological mechanisms. Among evolutionary psychologists, the Swiss Army knife serves as a popular metaphor for the mind (Cosmides 1994). The knife "contains separate tools--each designed to perform a particular task effectively. The human brain also appears to come equipped with cognitive tools designed to carry out specific functions" (Buss & Kenrick 1998, p. 991). Each of these cognitive tools is asserted to have come into existence in response to specific selection pressures and to have acquired its particular form and rules of operation as a result of natural selection. The mind has been described as having highly specific adaptations-akin to "a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally generated computers" ( . Meanwhile, others discuss how evolutionary thinking may illuminate why we systematically deviate from rationality in contemporary environments because our minds employ heuristics that were sufficient for "ecological rationality" in the environments of our ancestral past (Gigerenzer 2000).
Sociologists often think that an evolutionary perspective implies that human beings have been programmed to behave as if they are striving to maximize their inclusive fitness. Indeed, some early sociobiology did at least implicitly take this view, and current work in the most prominent alternative to evolutionary psychology in Darwinian social science, human behavioral ecology, often generates models based on a theoretical "gambit" that effectively presumes this (for reviews, Evolutionary psychologists certainly propose that psychological mechanisms can evolve to produce different outputs (e.g., behaviors) given different inputs from the environment. For example, contingent response would be part of any specifically evolved mechanism that yielded preferential treatment of biological children over unrelated children. Another example is the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, which proposes that, because reproductive variance is higher for males than females, higher-status parents will invest relatively more in their sons and lowerstatus parents will invest relatively more in their daughters ( Some evolved mechanisms are proposed to be "set" by conditions of early childhood and have enduring effects on behavior thereafter. One theory proposes that cues of resource instability in early environments place girls on different "tracks" of sexual development, with unstable environments evoking a short-term strategy marked by earlier first intercourse, more partners, and shorter pair-bonds over the life course (Belsky et al. 1991). Also, Sulloway (1996) has proposed that children have an evolved tendency to develop personality traits, attitudes, and behavioral propensities that will maximize the resources they receive from their parents, and systematic differences in the maximizing strategies of firstborns and laterborns result in many different kinds of birth-order effects among adults (but see Freese et al. 1999). Theories of mechanisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions give evolutionary psychology a greater consonance with conventional social scientific thinking, and such theorizing also provides a means of accounting for individual differences as products of Darwinian evolution while maintaining a commitment to the psychological unity of humankind.
Even so, it might be more accurate to say that what evolutionary psychologists actually endorse is the psychic unity of "mankind" and "womankind"; for when one looks at what is actually published under the banner of evolutionary psychology, theories and studies of innate, evolved sex differences predominate. Nearly 70% of the pages in the substantive chapters of Buss's (1999) evolutionary psychology textbook contain at least some discussion or mention of a putatively innate behavioral difference between men and women. As just some examples, Why the overwhelming attention to sex differences? For one thing, common statistical methods are much better at establishing differences than uniformities, and using experimental or questionnaire studies to test if a hypothesized mean difference exists between male and female participants is a relatively straightforward means to high publication fertility. However, theories of sex differences may actually be where the form of evolutionary psychology's reasoning most closely matches the classic positivistic ideal, in which a small number of premises deductively generate a large number of testable empirical implications. Roughly, because the absolute minimal investment required to bring a child into being is higher for women than men (compare gestation to ejaculation), females have more of their reproductive potential tied up in any one child. Combine this with the possibility of uncertain paternity for males, and females can be predicted to be the sex that invests more in offspring (Trivers 1972). The sex that invests more serves as the limiting resource for reproduction, which implies that mating competition should be keener for men and that the risks of bad mating decisions are greater for women.
Chains of reasoning that begin here provide the basis for most of the Darwinian explanations of sex differences in the aforementioned areas. Even so, deriving theoretical propositions about social life is rarely an uncontestable business, and feminist (and other) critics have provided a sustained critique of evolutionary psychology's theories of sex differences (e.g. 
THE RELEVANCE OF GENETIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERSONS
Identical twins are more similar in many ways than are fraternal twins or nontwin siblings, who, in turn, are more similar than adopted individuals who are biologically unrelated but reared together. Such phenomena are commonly attributed to the varying extents to which these different types of pairs share genes. More generally, another way of asserting the relevance of "biology" for the study of social behavior is to propose that understanding the variation among individuals in traits and behaviors of interest requires reference to differences in genetic endowments. Note that when evolutionary psychologists consider behavioral variation, they often do so with the idea that the evolved genetic programs that all humans share respond differently to various environmental inputs. Behavioral genetics, meanwhile, pursues questions with implications for how genetic differences between persons can yield behavioral variation when environmental inputs are the same.
Discussions of behavioral genetics are often framed in terms of the question of how much variation in a trait is explained by "genes" versus "the environment." If one accepts certain assumptions, one can simply double the difference between correlation coefficients for identical and fraternal twins on a trait and obtain an estimate of that trait's heritability, the proportion of population variance in the trait that is attributable to genetic differences between individuals ( In addition, behavioral genetics is becoming increasingly linked to molecular genetics. Some studies have identified particular genes linked to certain behavioral traits, and then using quantitative genetic models, researchers have estimated the corresponding effects at the population level (e.g., Lesch et al. 1996) . Investigators have also started to incorporate measures of particular genes into studies to examine how they interact with specific environmental factors (e.g., Caspi et al. 2002). Increasingly sophisticated research designs and the possibilities afforded by genotypic measures likely mean that behavioral genetics will be an even more formidable enterprise in the study of human development in the years to come.
THE RELEVANCE OF PROXIMATE BIOLOGICAL VARIABLES
Both Darwinian behavioral science and behavioral genetics are more diverse undertakings than is commonly credited, and yet what we wish to combine together in this last section is far more varied still. If one accepts that human beings are material entities all the way through, then all our thoughts and actions are embodied, imply thoroughly physical processes, and are "biological" activities in the sense of being part of our ongoing constitution as organisms. Even so, the various idioms with which social scientists typically consider behavior rarely require explicit reference to the materiality of human actors; that is, humans can be disembodied abstractions in the language of theory, even if unrelentingly embodied in actual practice. Proximate physiological mechanisms and processes are thus effectively treated as a black box in much social scientific thinking, but another way of asserting the relevance of "biology" is to assert the necessity or value of opening this black box and extracting information about the physical workings of our bodies and minds.
Various kinds of biomeasurement continue to become more sophisticated and offer insight into a deeper array of internal processes. Thinking about the sociological use of such measurements has long centered on behavioral endocrinology, and, of the many hormones in our body, testosterone has stimulated the most interest among sociologists. We can use testosterone as a running exemplar to think about some of the various ways that proximate bioindicators can enter into social scientific discourse. Testosterone has been the subject of longstanding interest, which, given its fundamental role in biological sex differentiation, is perhaps not surprising. Moreover, because testosterone is commonly posited to behaviorally differentiate members of the same sex in ways similar to whatever differences it creates between the sexes, proposals about innate sex differences in behavior can be easily reposed as hypotheses about possible within-sex differences. In other words, testosterone might be an exogenous variable that explains why some men (and women) are more masculine than others. . As a less wellknown example, low resting heart rate appears to be related to violent behavior, whether in terms of self-reports, teacher reports, or convictions. This relationship is believed perhaps to reflect relationships among resting heart rate, fearlessness, and subsequent propensities for risk-taking behavior (Farrington 1997). As with testosterone, the effects of both serotonin and low resting heart rates interact with external social conditions in ways that seem to exacerbate consequences for individuals of low socioeconomic status and so invite biosocial What is plain from all we have and have not talked about, however, is that the biological sciences are moving quickly and there exists a panoply of different kinds of inquiries that sociologists can pursue. Daunting perhaps are the depths of the extradisciplinary literatures or collaborations into which one must wade to pursue some kinds of inquiries. Even worse, part of what may have discouraged greater sociological participation in some of these areas is that work is often cast in languages that make the potential offerings to and by sociologists less than apparent, except as something for the discipline to persistently oppose. However, the relative absence of sociologists at the table may be precisely why some of the language is as it is, or at least why more congenial alternative idioms remain to be formulated. Although much sociology can and will proceed without any reference to the specific materiality of human actors, the discipline should not opt itself out of participating in or with intellectual enterprises that will likely continue to excite enormous attention from the public, other social sciences, and major funding agencies. As science continues to reveal more about the biology of behavior-in all of its various senses-sociology should seek and support ways of understanding the interrelationship of biological and social influences that will allow our discipline to gain strength from these new developments rather than be diminished by them.
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